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Abstract
The traditional law of leases imposed no duty on landlords to mitigate dam-
ages in the event of tenant breach, whereas the modern law of leases does. An
economic model of leases, in which absentee tenants may or may not intend to
breach, shows that the traditional rule promotes tenant investment in the property
by discouraging landlord entry. In contrast, the modern rule prevents the prop-
erty from being left idle by encouraging landlords to enter and re-let abandoned
property. The model reflects the historic use of the traditional rule for agricultural
leases, where absentee use was valuable, and the emergence of the modern rule
for residential leases, where the primary use entails continuous occupation.
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Lease Defaults and the Efficient Mitigation of Damages 
 
1. INTRODUCTION  
 Leases represent fundamental tools in property markets. They also present an 
interesting challenge to economists. In the event of breach or disagreement among the 
parties, courts can construe the written and implied terms of lease agreements differently 
depending upon whether the agreements are interpreted using the doctrines of property 
law or using the doctrines of contract law. One example is the requirement that the victim 
of a breach of a lease undertake reasonable efforts to mitigate the damages from a breach.  
Historically, courts viewed real estate leases from the perspective of property law, which 
imposes no such duty on the landlord. Courts in many states, however, are increasingly 
interpreting residential leases according to the doctrines of contract law, which do require 
that landlords exert reasonable effort to re-let the leased property in the event of apparent 
abandonment by the tenant.  
The law of leases currently straddles the boundary between property law and 
contract law (Miceli, Sirmans, and Turnbull, 2001; Merrill and Smith, 2001, pp.820-833). 
The challenge is to explain the evolving interpretation of some types of leases, while at 
the same time explaining why the changes do not uniformly apply to all types of leases. 
This paper assesses the economic aspects of damage mitigation in the event of breach and 
offers an explanation for the trend among states toward establishing a duty by residential 
landlords to mitigate their damages when tenants breach their leases.  
Before turning to the analysis, it is appropriate to acknowledge at this point that 
there are some economists who view the differences between property and contract law 
as arcane details that are irrelevant to market theory. The assumption is that any 
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voluntary agreement made by individuals or organizations are contracts, the terms of 
which are uniformly enforced by courts. This view, however, overlooks the fact that not 
all terms of an agreement are enforceable in the event of breach. The legal principles 
applied by courts determine whether or not contracts are set aside entirely, or specific 
terms of the agreement deemed unenforceable, regardless of the actual intent of the 
parties at the time the agreement was made (Miceli, 2004, pp.113-126).1 In sum, 
institutions like legal doctrines matter in market transactions. As illustrated by the 
mitigation requirement, the specific redress for breach of lease varies according to the 
body of law applied by the court. At root, the task at hand is to explain why different 
types of leases draw from different bodies of law.  
The urban and real estate literature for the most part assumes the legal doctrine 
underlying leases is given and presents no impediment to enforcing the agreements 
(Brueckner, 1993; Cho and Shilling, 2007; Grenadier, 1995; Miceli and Sirmans, 1995). 
This is understandable given the focus on commercial property leases, and the fact that 
commercial property has not experienced as profound a change in legal doctrine as has 
residential property. Nonetheless, questions about the changing functions of lease 
doctrine are properly viewed as part of the broader question about how legal rules 
underpin property markets and how they affect resource allocation in the urban context. 
For example, Miceli, Sirmans, and Turnbull (2000) show how the rules used to resolve 
conflicting claims to property title influence the pace and spatial pattern of urban land 
development. Likewise, Miceli, Sirmans, and Turnbull (2003) derive the effects of 
adverse possession laws on land use decisions in a monocentric growing urban area, 
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while Baker et al. (2001) empirically examine how the range of feasible land use 
opportunities in turn influence states’ adverse possession laws.  
From the developing country perspective, Hoy and Jimenez (1991), De Meza and 
Gould (1992), and Turnbull (2009) study urban squatting as an equilibrium outcome, a 
feature arising from the private enforcement of property rights in lieu of formal  adverse 
possession rules. Informal residential rental markets in developing countries offer a 
contrast to the US experience in the sense that the law establishes no lease that is 
enforceable by appealing to courts. Turnbull (2009) examines the consequences of 
informal rental markets for longer term land use patterns. The results illustrate how the 
lack of a legal doctrine governing leases makes it impossible to resolve moral hazard by 
both parties in the agreement. The unifying theme of this literature is that property and 
lease laws systematically affect land use patterns and the pace of urban development.  
 The analysis in this paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 begins the analysis 
with a review of the law concerning mitigation of damages in leases.  Section 3 then 
develops a model of the trade-off between the traditional property and modern contract 
rules.  One possible explanation for the observed trend is that it reflects the view of courts 
that the duty to mitigate should fall on the party who can replace the defaulting tenant at 
lowest cost, and in modern leases, this is the landlord.  While not dismissing this 
possibility, our analysis offers a different perspective, focusing instead on the ability of 
the landlord to use observed tenant behavior as an accurate signal of the tenant’s intent to 
default. In this context the benefit of the traditional (no-mitigation) rule derives from the 
potential value of absentee use of property by tenants, coupled with the inability of 
landlords and courts to accurately observe the intention of absentee tenants regarding 
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continued future use as opposed to true abandonment of the property.  Thus, the 
traditional, or property law, doctrine requiring no mitigation is appropriate when the 
likelihood of tenant abandonment, conditional on his absence from the property, is low 
(reflecting a high value of absentee use), while the contract law doctrine requiring 
mitigation by the landlord is appropriate when the reverse is true.   
 It is also worth noting at the outset that, under traditional property law principles, 
abandonment of the property and delinquency of rent are treated as separate issues, but 
neither entitles the landlord to enter the premises.  If a tenant fails to pay rent, whether or 
not she is present, the landlord can only sue for recovery of rent; he cannot enter the 
property or evict the tenant (Cribbet, 1971, Chapter 4; Miceli et al., 2001).  Thus, under 
the traditional rule at least, delinquency of rent is not generally a reliable signal of an 
intention to abandon.  Consequently, we do not explicitly consider this issue in the 
model.      
Section 4 extends the basic analysis from Section 3 to residential and commercial 
leases, and also considers the impact of heterogeneous tenants.  Finally, section 5 
concludes. 
2. REVIEW OF THE RELEVANT LEGAL PRINCIPLES 
 Under the traditional law of leases, which predates contract law, the lease was a 
conveyance.  Once the landlord conveyed the property to the tenant, his duty was 
complete; the tenant in effect was the owner of the property during the term of the lease.  
Thus, if the tenant failed to take possession or abandoned the property, the landlord had 
no duty to attempt to re-let it.  Instead, he could simply “fold his hands and hold the 
tenant for rent for the full term” (Cribbet, 1975, p.190).   
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 The traditional “no-mitigation” rule, however, has been overtaken in many states 
by the modern rule that requires landlords to take reasonable steps to re-let the property 
in the event of tenant breach.  This rule is based on the view that a lease is a contract, and 
contract law requires mitigation by victims of breach.2  The problem the modern rule 
creates for landlords, however, is the need to distinguish between tenants who have 
legally abandoned the leased property, and those who are absent but not intending to 
breach.  In order to prove legal abandonment, the landlord must establish “an intention by 
the tenant to abandon, plus conduct by which the intent is carried into effect” (Friedman, 
1997, p.1092).   
 Imposing a duty to mitigate on landlords therefore often requires them to ascertain 
the tenant’s unstated intent from the latter’s conduct.  The question is, what specific 
conduct will be judged by the court ex post as reflecting an intention to abandon?  Case 
law has established that voluntary discontinuation of regular business operations on the 
leased property, even for a period of years, will not, in itself, be so judged.  For example, 
in Berae v. Gorman (1969), the tenant had ceased commercial operations and even 
missed a rental payment, but the court found no intention to abandon the lease based on 
the tenant’s claim of an intention to re-open and the presence of saleable merchandise on 
the premises. Similarly, in Smith v. Favilla (1979), the court found no abandonment had 
occurred when the tenant, after construction of a pig barn, ceased pig farming but left 
personal property in the barn. Even nonuse of a railroad spur for fourteen years was not 
judged by the court as sufficient evidence of an intention to abandon the leased property. 
(Simkin v. New York C.R. Co., 1966).  Finally, courts sometimes even refuse to accept the 
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apparently definitive act of “tossing the keys” to the landlord or his agent as evidence of 
the tenant’s intention to abandon.3   
 All of this illustrates the fundamental trade-off underlying the choice between a 
rule that requires mitigation by landlords and one that does not.  On the one hand, 
efficiency dictates that landlords should mitigate damages by finding a new tenant in the 
event of true abandonment,4 but on the other, mere absence of the tenant is not 
inconsistent with continued efficient use of the property by that tenant. The traditional 
(no-mitigation) rule therefore places priority on protecting the incumbent tenant’s right to 
use the property in any way she sees fit (including absentee uses) by barring entry of 
landlords during the term of the lease under almost any conditions (including, as noted, 
non-payment of rent).  The cost, however, is that the property may be left idle in the 
event of true breach by the tenant.  In effect, the traditional rule reflects the court’s 
preference, in the face of uncertainty about the tenant’s intent, to err in the direction of 
protecting the tenant’s rights to the property. 
In contrast, the modern rule places priority on re-letting the property in the event 
of breach.  The cost in this case is that some apparent breaches by tenants will result in 
their replacement by less efficient users of the property, given uncertainty by both the 
landlord (ex ante) and the court (ex post) about the true intention of the tenant.  The 
modern rule therefore reflects the court’s decision to err in the direction of promoting 
mitigation by the landlord.   
The preceding argument suggests that the traditional and modern rules represent 
imperfect (second-best) responses to the problem of tenant abandonment.  But consider a 
third rule that holds tenants liable for the losses due to a failure to mitigate, unless they 
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first inform landlords of their intention to abandon.5  Such a rule should be able to 
achieve the first-best outcome by encouraging tenants to reveal their private information, 
thereby inducing landlords to enter and mitigate optimally.  In fact, that is probably what 
happens in most cases, given the joint interests of the parties in resolving their dispute out 
of court.  The difficulty, however, is that transaction costs and missing or judgment-proof 
tenants—problems that are highly likely in the case of abandonment—will often prevent 
the necessary transfer of information.  Thus, landlords and courts are left to infer the 
intention of silent tenants, which takes us back to the trade-off described above.  The 
analysis in this paper highlights the role of the law in resolving these difficult cases, 
which after all are the ones that end up in court. 
3. THE MODEL 
 We begin with a simple model in which a risk-neutral landlord and tenant enter 
into a lease for a piece of property.  For concreteness, we focus initially on an agricultural 
context but later extend the results to residential and commercial leases.  The model 
employs the following notation: 
 x = dollar investment in the property by the tenant; 
 V(x) = gross value of the leased property to the tenant as a function of x, V′>0,  
V″< 0; 
 R = fixed rent for the lease period. 
In the case of an agricultural or commercial tenant, x represents crops or other 
improvements of the property.  For residential tenants, x could represent improvements 
like painting the walls, but it could also reflect other location-specific investments, like 
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taking a nearby job or joining a local health club, that would be less valuable if the tenant 
were forced to relocate. 
 The rent for the lease period is agreed to before the start of the lease. At the start 
of the lease, the tenant chooses x to maximize the expected value of the lease.  In a world 
in which tenants never breach, x would therefore maximize V(x)−x−R, which yields the 
first-order condition V′−1=0 .   We assume, however, that some breaches of the lease by 
the tenant are unavoidable.  For simplicity, we do not explicitly model the reasons for 
such breach, but instead assume that they are exogenous and arise stochastically. In the 
event of a breach, we assume that the value of the initial tenant’s investment in the 
property is zero to either the landlord or replacement tenants, that is, x is non-
salvageable.6    
 Suppose that after the tenant spends x on the investment in improvements to the 
property, there are some states of the world in which he chooses (or needs) to be absent 
from the property without necessarily intending to abandon it permanently.  Let q be the 
exogenous probability that such a state occurs.  Thus, 1–q is the probability that the 
tenant remains on the property.  This gives rise to a private information environment. 
Although the landlord observes whether or not the tenant is absent, he cannot observe if 
this absence represents a true breach of the lease—i.e., a permanent abandonment of the 
property with the resulting loss of V(x)—or whether it is consistent with continued use of 
the property (and hence no loss of V(x)).  Let p be the conditional probability that the 
tenant’s absence represents a true beach, and 1−p the probability that it does not. Thus, qp 
is the unconditional probability of a true breach, and 1−qp is the unconditional 
probability of no breach.7 
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 In the event of the tenant’s absence, the landlord may enter (i.e., take possession) 
and re-let the property.  If he does, V(x) is lost, but the new tenant obtains a value of v 
from the property (which we assume is the rent that he pays to the landlord net of the 
landlord’s search cost). As noted, we treat v as independent of x, meaning that the new 
tenant does not appropriate any portion of the original tenant’s investment in the 
property. We also assume that  
(1)     0)( >> vxV  
in the neighborhood of the equilibrium value of x. The first inequality ensures that 
continued occupation by the original tenant is preferred to replacement by a new tenant 
when breach has not occurred (for relevant x), while the second implies that mitigation is 
desirable when true breach has occurred.   
We further assume that  
(2)     R > v, 
or that the current tenant’s rent exceeds the value of the property to the new tenant (the 
next best user).  We expect this to be true for several reasons.  First, v should be thought 
of as an expected value that takes into account both the search costs involved in finding a 
new tenant as well as the possibility that no tenant will be found.  Second, if we assume 
that the original tenant was (and continues to be) the highest valuer of the property, then 
her rent should represent the highest bid available.  Finally, v reflects the value of the 
property as altered by the original tenant.  This will tend to make it less valuable to a new 
user. 
 The sequence of events and payoffs to the parties are shown in Figure 1.  First, the 
tenant chooses his level of investment x, then nature moves, determining first whether the 
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tenant is absent from the property, and second, whether the tenant’s absence represents a 
breach.  In the event the tenant is observed to be absent, the landlord decides whether or 
not to enter and mitigate damages.  The dashed line connecting the landlord’s two 
decision nodes reflects the assumption that when the landlord makes his entry choice, he 
does not know whether the tenant has truly breached the lease or is merely absent.  At 
each terminal point in the tree, the payoffs are shown, first for the tenant, then the 
landlord, then the joint, or “social” return.  In some cases, the payoffs for the landlord and 
tenant include damage payments, representing the legal rules governing tenant breach 
and, when applicable, the landlord’s duty to mitigate.  These will be specified below. 
Social Optimum 
 As a benchmark, we begin by examining the socially optimal outcome in a world 
where there is no uncertainty regarding the tenant’s breach.  (That is, the landlord knows 
which node he is at when he makes his decision of whether or not to enter the property 
and take possession.)  Note that neither the legal rules (as embodied by the damage 
payments) nor the rent matter for this analysis since they are merely transfer payments 
(i.e., they do not appear in the social returns).    
First, consider the landlord’s entry decision, given that the tenant has chosen some 
level of x and is observed to be absent from the property. (The landlord has no decision to 
make in the state where the tenant remains present on the property.)  Note that for any x, 
the conditions in (1) imply that entry and mitigation are only desirable when the tenant 
has truly breached.  This reflects the assumption that, once the tenant has spent x, she is 
the highest valuing user of the property in the no-breach state and therefore should not be 
replaced.  In this state, the social return is V(x)−x.  However, mitigation is desirable in the 
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breach state in order to salvage some value from the property, in which case the social 
return is v−x.8 
 To establish a benchmark for evaluating the different legal rules, consider the 
efficient level of x given efficient mitigation. Recall that qp is the probability of breach 
and 1−qp is the probability of no breach.  Thus, the expected social value of the property 
at the point when x must be chosen is given by 
(3)    (1−qp)V(x) + qpv − x.       
The socially optimal choice of x therefore solves 
(4)    (1−qp)V′(x) – 1 = 0.       
Let x*(p) denote the solution to (4).  Note that x*(p) is decreasing in p, reflecting a lower 
optimal investment as the conditional probability of breach increases.9  Substituting x*(p) 
into (3) yields the maximized expected value of the lease: 
(5)   W*(p) = (1−qp)V(x*(p)) + qpv − x*(p),    
where W*(p) is also decreasing in p (see Figure 2).  This expression will serve as a 
benchmark for the outcomes under the two rules.  
Equilibrium under the Traditional Rule 
 We now turn to the actual decisions of the parties when the landlord (and the 
court) are uncertain about the tenant’s intent.  We first consider the traditional rule.  
Recall that this rule imposes no duty on landlords to mitigate damages in the event of 
tenant breach.  Rather, when the landlord observes an absentee tenant, he has the option 
to enter and mitigate, or to sit tight and collect the full rent.  The latter option implies 
that, in the event that the tenant fails to pay the rent and the landlord chooses not to enter, 
the landlord is entitled to damages equal to the rent, or DN=R.  Consequently, by not 
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entering, the landlord is assured of receiving R, whether or not the tenant has truly 
breached.10   
 Alternatively, the landlord can enter and attempt to re-let the property to a new 
tenant.  In the event of a true breach, the landlord receives v from the new tenant, but by 
entering he risks extinguishing the original tenant’s rental obligation if the court views 
the lease through the lens of property law and interprets landlord entry as acceptance of 
surrender (Cribbet, 1975, p.191).  In order to highlight this distinguishing feature of the 
traditional rule, we assume that landlord entry eliminates the tenant’s rental obligation 
with certainty (i.e., DE=0).  Thus, if the landlord enters and re-lets the property in this 
case, his return is11 
(6)     DE + v = v.       
   Suppose instead that the landlord enters when the tenant did not intend to breach.  
In that case, the tenant may succeed in ejecting the landlord, in which case the tenancy is 
restored and the landlord collects the rent R.  Alternatively, the court, given its inability to 
observe the tenant’s true intent, may incorrectly interpret the latter’s absence as a breach, 
in which case the landlord’s return is identical to that in (6).  Let β be the probability that 
the court correctly ejects the landlord.  (Thus, 1−β is the probability of legal error—i.e., 
an incorrect interpretation of the tenant’s absence.)  The landlord’s expected return from 
entry in the no-breach state is therefore 
(7)    βR + (1−β)(DE+v) = βR + (1−β)v.     
(Note that when β=1, this simply reduces to R.)  Weighting (6) by p (the probability of 
breach given the tenant’s absence) and (7) by 1−p yields the landlord’s expected return 
from entry:12 
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(8)    R − [1−(1−p)β](R−v),       
In general, this is less than R (given (2)), reflecting the fact that, by entering, the landlord 
risks losing his claim for damages of R−v against the original tenant. As a result, a 
rational landlord will never enter under the traditional rule, since by staying out, he 
retains a claim for the full rent against the original tenant. Note that this conclusion is 
true even if β=1, for in that case, (8) becomes R−p(R−v)<R.  Thus, even in the absence 
of legal error the landlord will prefer not to enter in the event of tenant absence under the 
traditional rule.  Legal error will play a more pivotal role in our analysis of the modern 
rule below. 
 Next consider the optimal choice of x by the tenant, given the anticipated behavior 
by the landlord (non-entry).   The tenant’s expected value from the lease at the time she 
chooses x is given by 
(9)    (1-qp)V(x) – x − R.      
 Since the resulting first-order condition is identical to (4), the tenant chooses the 
efficient level of investment, x*(p).  Intuitively, because the landlord never enters, the 
tenant’s property rights are fully protected against the risk of unintended loss.  That is, 
the tenant never runs the risk of being removed from the property if she vacates without 
intending to abandon (breach).  As a result, she invests efficiently in the property. 
 While the preceding shows that the traditional rule provides efficient incentives 
for tenant investment by deterring landlord entry, the rule obviously does not provide the 
correct incentives for mitigation in the event of true tenant breach.  This can be seen by 
noting that the joint value of the lease under the traditional rule, given the equilibrium 
behavior of the parties, is   
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(10)    WT(p) = (1−qp)V(x*(p)) − x*(p),     
which is less than the first-best value in (5) due to the absence of the expected value of 
mitigation, qpv.  Thus, WT(p) deviates further from first-best the larger is the probability 
that tenant absence is a sign of true breach.  The relationship between W*(p) and WT(p) is 
shown in Figure 2. 
Equilibrium under the Modern Rule 
 Unlike property law, contract law imposes a duty on landlords to mitigate 
damages in the event of tenant breach.  Specifically, the landlord must exercise due 
diligence in re-letting the property in the event of tenant abandonment.  The law enforces 
this obligation by awarding damages to the landlord that equal the rent less the reasonable 
rental value of the property in the event of tenant breach, whether or not the landlord 
actually obtains a new tenant.  In terms of the model, this implies that DE=DN=R−v.  
Compared to the traditional rule, damages for breach in this case are therefore lower 
when the landlord does not enter (R−v < R), but higher when he does (R−v > 0).  While 
the traditional rule deterred entry, we will see that the modern rule encourages i t. 
 Consider first the landlord’s entry decision when the tenant is observed to be 
absent from the property.  If he chooses not to enter, he receives the rent R if the tenant 
has not breached, but his damages are limited to DN=R−v if the tenant has breached, 
where the limitation reflects the duty to mitigate.13  His expected return from non-entry is 
thus 
(11)    (1−p)R + p(R−v) = R − pv.      
 Suppose instead that the landlord chooses to enter.  If the tenant has truly 
breached, the landlord recovers damages of DE=R−v from the original tenant, and rent of 
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v from the new tenant, yielding a combined return of R.  Note that in this case, the 
landlord does not risk forfeiting his claim to damages from the original tenant by 
entering, which is the key feature distinguishing the modern rule from the traditional rule.    
If, however, the tenant has not breached, suppose, as above, that the tenant 
succeeds in ejecting the landlord with probability β, but she will be found in breach with 
probability 1−β, in which case she will owe damages of R−v.  Since the landlord will 
obtain v from a new tenant in the latter case, his overall expected return from entering in 
the no-breach state is βR+(1−β)(DE+v)=R.  It follows that entry yields the landlord a 
return of R regardless of whether or not the tenant intended to breach.  Since this exceeds 
the return from non-entry in (11), the landlord will always enter under the modern rule 
based on contract law.  Of course, this is precisely the purpose of the rule; namely, to 
provide an incentive for landlords to enter and mitigate damages in the event of tenant 
breach.   
The problem with the modern rule in this real estate context is that it results in 
“excessive” entry, given the landlord’s and court’s inability to observe an absentee 
tenant’s intentions.  It therefore reduces the security of the tenant’s property right at the 
time that he makes his investment decision.  To see this, note that when the tenant is 
absent from the property but not intending to breach, she expects to lose possession with 
probability 1−β as a result of legal error.  Thus, the expected value of the lease to the 
tenant, given the anticipation of landlord entry under the contract rule, is 
  [(1−q)+q(1−p)β][V(x)−R] − q[p+(1−p)(1−β)]DE − x 
(12)   = [(1−q)+q(1−p)β]V(x) − R + q[p+(1−p)(1−β)]v − x.   
The tenant’s optimal choice of x therefore solves the first order condition 
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(13)    [(1−q)+q(1−p)β]V′(x) – 1 = 0.     
Let xˆ (p) denote the solution to (13), where )(ˆ px  is decreasing in p.  A comparison of (4) 
and (13) shows that )(*)(ˆ pxpx <  for β<1 and p<1.  Thus, the tenant underinvests in the 
property under the modern contract rule to the extent that there are possible states in 
which she can lose possession without intending to breach.  This represents the 
inefficiency associated with a rule compelling landlord mitigation in a world of 
uncertainty.   
The resulting social value of the property under the modern rule is given by 
(14)  )(ˆ)]1)(1([))(ˆ(])1()1[()( pxvppqpxVpqqpW M −−−++−+−= ββ , 
which is decreasing in p  (see Figure 2.)  It is important to note that if β=1, 
)(*)(ˆ pxpx =  and WM(p)=W*(p) for all p.  Thus, in the absence of legal error, the 
modern rule achieves the first-best outcome.  This is true because if courts correctly 
perceive the intention of tenants, they can prevent excessive entry by the landlord by 
simply expelling him whenever the tenant’s absence is not a sign of breach.  In contrast 
to the traditional rule, therefore, the possibility of legal error (β<1) is an important source 
of inefficiency under the modern rule because it means that the court is unable to prevent 
excessive landlord entry.14 
Comparing the Two Rules 
 In comparing the traditional property and modern contract rules, we note first that 
both yield second-best outcomes.  This is due to the landlord’s and court’s inability to 
correctly distinguish between those states in which the tenant’s absence represents a true 
abandonment of the property (breach of the lease) and those in which it does not.  As a 
result, the law can at best provide an imperfect instrument: it can either deter entry so as 
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to fully protect the tenant’s property rights, thereby encouraging efficient investment ex 
ante (the traditional rule); or it can induce entry, thereby guaranteeing efficient mitigation 
ex post (the modern rule).  The preferred rule depends on which of these objectives has 
the greater effect on the expected value of the property. 
 Formally, the relevant comparison is between (10) and (14).  We have seen that 
the traditional rule induces the tenant to make the efficient level of investment, x*(p), but 
that it provides no incentive for mitigation in the event of breach.  Comparing the 
resulting value of the property in (10) to the first-best level in (5), we see that the former 
can be written as WT(p)=W*(p)−qpv.  Thus, for p=0, WT(0)=W*(0), but for p>0, 
WT(p)<W*(p), where the difference between the two values is increasing in p.  Thus, 
when tenant absence is never a sign of breach, the traditional rule yields the first-best 
outcome.  However, as the possibility of breach conditional on absence increases, the 
outcome under the traditional rule diverges further from the first-best.  This is shown 
graphically in Figure 2. 
 As for the modern rule, the comparison of WM(p) and W*(p) is a bit more 
complicated because )(ˆ)(* pxpx > for p<1.  However, it is straightforward to show that 
W*(p)>WM(p) for p<1 and β<1,15 and that W*(1)=WM(1).  Thus, the modern rule yields 
the first-best outcome only in the extreme case where all  tenant absences are a sign of 
breach; otherwise it results in a lower value of the property. This case is also shown in 
Figure 2. 
 The preceding implies that the valuation functions WT(p) and WM(p) must cross at 
a single, intermediate point shown by p~  in Figure 2.  As a result, when pp ~< , 
WT(p)>WM(p), but when pp ~> , WT(p)<WM(p).  Intuitively, when landlords and courts 
 18
cannot observe the intent of tenants, the traditional rule is preferred when tenant absence 
is not good evidence of an intention to breach the lease (low p), whereas the modern rule 
is preferred when tenant absence is good evidence of such an intention (high p).  
4. DISCUSSION OF THE RESULTS 
Agricultural versus Residential and Commercial Leases  
 Traditionally, the law of leases primarily applied to leases of land for agricultural 
use.  In this context, extended absence of the tenant from the property is not necessarily a 
sign of breach.  For example, farmers may choose not to occupy land outside of growing 
season or when certain fields are being left fallow as part of a practice of crop rotation. 
This suggests that for agricultural leases, p is low, making the traditional rule more 
efficient than the modern rule. 
 In contrast, modern residential leases are primarily for shelter, which generally 
entails continuous occupation.  Thus, an extended tenant absence is more likely a sign of 
an intention to abandon (i.e., the value of the option to leave the space vacant, while not 
zero, is much lower than in the agricultural context).  Also, location-specific investments 
are probably less important for residential, as compared to commercial and agricultural, 
leases.  These reasons suggest that, consistent with the current legal trend, the modern 
rule is more efficient for residential leases.   
Commercial leasing appears to resemble more closely the agricultural case 
because the option to leave land vacant is likely to be high, for example if it is used 
primarily for storage or for use in unforeseen circumstances. This is consistent with the 
greater tenacity of the traditional property rule for commercial leases.  The preceding 
conclusions suggest that both the historical trend toward adoption of a duty to mitigate 
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damages for residential leases, and the slower adoption of this rule for commercial leases, 
are consistent with economic efficiency.   
Heterogeneous Tenants 
We have assumed throughout the analysis that tenants are homogeneous, but 
suppose tenants vary in the importance that they attach to location-specific investments.  
In this setting, the modern rule may have an advantage over the traditional rule in the 
sense that landlords will disproportionately evict tenants with a low value of investing 
because the latter will be more likely to be absent from the property. The result is a kind 
of screening process that selects for those tenants who place a relatively high value on 
property-specific investments.   This sort of favorable selection is not possible under the 
old rule because eviction is not allowed.16      
5. CONCLUSION 
 The traditional common law viewed leases through the lens of property law, 
which, among other things, implied that landlords had no duty to re-let property during 
the term of a lease in the event of tenant abandonment.  Rather, the landlord could simply 
sit tight and sue for the rent.  The modern law of leases (at least in the residential context) 
has changed this; leases are now viewed as contracts, and landlords have an affirmative 
duty to mitigate damages.  This paper has developed an economic model of leases to 
explain this change in the law. 
 According to the model, the principal benefit of the traditional rule is that it gives 
tenants secure property rights during the term of the lease, thereby encouraging beneficial 
investment in the property.  This is especially valuable for tenants who value absentee 
use. The offsetting cost is that the landlord is discouraged from entering and re-letting the 
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property when the tenant abandons it.  The ideal rule would therefore permit landlord 
entry only when a tenant’s absence represents a true intention to breach.  The problem is 
that the tenant’s intent is often unstated and hence unobservable.  Thus, the law must 
choose whether the benefits of secure property rights outweigh the cost of leaving the 
property idle in the event of breach.   
In light of this trade-off, we showed that the traditional rule is preferred when the 
value of absentee use by tenants is high (i.e., absence is not a good signal of breach), 
while the modern rule is preferred when the reverse is true.  This result accords well with 
the adoption of the modern rule for residential leases, where the primary use of the 
property (for shelter) entails continuous occupation.  In contrast, the emergence of the 
traditional rule in the context of agricultural leases, and its tenacity for modern 
commercial leases, are consistent with absentee use in both of these contexts.    
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FOOTNOTES 
1. For example, courts can invalidate contract terms deemed unconscionable, that is, 
agreements deemed to be unfair to one of the parties ex post. Unconscionability is based 
on the court’s interpretation of the nature of the contract terms and not on agent 
incompetence, misinformation, duress, fraud or other criteria that also justify setting aside 
contracts or contract terms. Therefore, the unconscionability test raises the possibility of 
opportunism.  
2. “As a general rule, a party cannot recover damages for loss that he could have been 
avoided by reasonable efforts” Restatement (Second) of Contracts, § 350 (p. 127).  Also 
see the UCC, 2-715, which limits sellers’ liability to damages that “could not reasonably 
be prevented.” 
3. See, e.g., Gangadean v. Erickson (1972) and Friedman (1997, pp.1092-1093). 
4. For a general discussion of the desirability of mitigation, see Wittman (1981).  In the 
context of contract damages, see Goetz and Scott (1983) and Baird, et al. (1994, pp. 4-
75), and in the context of torts, see Shavell (1987, pp.158-159).  
5. This is similar to the rule from Hadley v. Baxendale (1854), which limits promisees’ 
damages for breach of contract unless they inform promisors that they will suffer 
unusually large costs in the event of breach. See Bebchuk and Shavell (1991). 
6. The qualitative conclusions of the model are unaffected by relaxing this assumption.   
7. We abstract from consideration of the specific reason for tenant abandonment or 
breach in order to focus on the issues of interest here. Our approach is not unusual. For 
example, the mortgage valuation literature adopts both exogenous and endogenous 
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borrower default models (Kau and Keenan, 1996; Vandell, 1996) as does the shopping 
center lease valuation literature (Grenadier, 1995; Cho and Shilling, 2007).   
8. Another benefit of mitigation, primarily in an urban setting, is the presence of spillover 
benefits accruing to neighboring property owners from continuous occupation of the 
property in question.  In a commercial or retail context, these benefits could represent 
inter-store externalities of the sort described in the literature on shopping centers 
(Brueckner, 1993; Miceli and Sirmans, 1995).  Likewise, in a residential context, they 
could represent the enhancement of neighboring property values from continued upkeep 
and maintenance of a given property.  If present, this effect would simply amplify the 
benefit of mitigation. We thank a referee for pointing out this dimension of the problem.    
9. Thus, x*(p) is maximized at p=0, the case where breach never occurs. 
10. We ignore the litigation costs of collecting damages, or the possibility of tenant 
bankruptcy. 
11. Consider a more general characterization of the traditional rule.  Let α be the 
probability that the landlord can recover damages of R−v when he enters and mitigates 
(i.e., he re-lets the property for v), while 1-α is the probability that he gets nothing.  In 
that case, DE=α(R−v), and entry yields DE+v=α(R−v)+v.  The implications of this 
formulation are shown in the next footnote.  
12. In the case where (6) is given by α(R−v)+v, (7) becomes βR+(1−β)[α(R−v)+v] and 
(8) becomes R−(1−θ)(R−v), where θ≡α+(1−α)(1−p)β<1.  For any α<1 (including α=0, 
as in the text) the landlord chooses not to enter under the traditional rule. 
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13. Strictly speaking, the landlord’s duty is to exert reasonable efforts to locate a new 
tenant.  We assume here that his efforts are always successful.  Alternatively, one could 
interpret v as the expected rent (net of search costs) from a new tenant. 
14. Even if the court operated without error in this respect, there would still be a cost 
associated with the need for court intervention to prevent excessive entry by the landlord. 
15. To see this, write (5) as W*(p,x) for arbitrary x, and similarly write (14) as WM(p,x) 
for arbitrary x.  It is easy to show that W*(p,x)>WM(p,x) for all x given p<1 and β<1.  It 
follows that )())(ˆ,())(ˆ,(*))(*,(*)(* pWpxpWpxpWpxpWpW MM ≡>≥≡ . 
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FIGURE 2: Comparison of the Two Rules. 
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FIGURE 1: Sequence of Events and Payoffs. 





     
